trustees have a fiduciary duty to watch students and their families. They play a role in defining the incentives that

College and university administrators and faculty are simply responding reasonably to professional incentives, while

university boards of trustees (sometimes called the board of governors or regents, or regents) are largely at fault.

The question then is, who let this happen? Koch and Cebula argue that the members of college and

influence, The question then is, who let this happen? Koch and Cebula argue that the members of college and
higher education lead to raise as much money as they can and spend it all in the pursuit of excellence, prestige, and


By Robert C. Lowy

Universities

Governance Boards and the Cost of Attending Public Colleges and

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Most of the regression models focus on the change in real (inflation-adjusted) in-state tuition and fees per full-time equivalent student from the 2003-04 academic year to 2016-17. This is measured as the actual change rather than the percentage change, without controlling for real tuition.

The authors begin with a review of family financial aid and fees. They note that increases in net tuition and fees, the price paid after financial aid is factored in, have understated the historical role of public universities as engines of economic mobility. The authors review data from a recent study by the Opportunity Insights program at Harvard, which suggests that increases in net tuition and fees, the price paid after financial aid is factored in, have understated the historical role of public universities as engines of economic mobility.

Chapters 2 and 4 provide analyses linking increases in different types of governing boards. The authors show data describing changes in tuition and fees and state support per FTE student for a sample of 275 public universities broken down by their educational missions and type of governing board. The authors also present results from multivariate regression models of the effect each variable has with other variables held constant, using a variety of economic models. This simple linear model was formed from exogenously given hundred public-year institution-based data.

Chapter 3 explores the relationship between tuitions and economic outcomes for family income groups. The authors report on financial aid and application forms. Both of these are specific measures that do not capture economic mobility, even when family incomes remain relatively fixed or even fall. However, it is worth noting that the Opportunity Insights data were not available until 2017. Before then, data might have been available to governing boards, and the percentage of students receiving Pell eligible until 2017. Before then, data might have been available to governing boards. It is worth noting that the Opportunity Insights data were not available until 2017. Before then, data might have been available to governing boards, and the percentage of students receiving Pell eligible until 2017. Before then, data might have been available to governing boards, and the percentage of students receiving Pell eligible until 2017. Before then, data might have been available to governing boards, and the percentage of students receiving Pell eligible until 2017. Before then, data might have been available to governing boards, and the percentage of students receiving Pell eligible until 2017. Before then, data might have been available to governing boards.

The authors emphasize that increases in net tuition and fees, the price paid after financial aid is factored in, have understated the historical role of public universities as engines of economic mobility.

The authors argue that the relationship between tuition and economic outcomes for family income groups is less clear than the relationship between tuition and economic mobility.
Chapter 6 focuses on initiatives that universities can undertake internally to control costs and thus increases in tuition and fees, while chapter 7 establishes universites as a more difficult task despite the potential benefits.

Established universities are a more difficult task despite the potential benefits.

An innovative approach to addressing the challenges faced by universities is to establish new governance structures within higher education institutions. This approach involves creating new, independent governing bodies that are responsible for making decisions regarding tuition and fee increases. By giving these bodies more autonomy, universities can respond more quickly to changing market conditions and better align their programs with the needs of students and employers.

Despite my reservations about some aspects of their analytical framework, the authors' main finding is supported by their analysis of the evidence. The data should explain price increases over the full period.
Economist and former government official Robert Lowry is a professor of political science at the University of Texas at Dallas. His teaching and research interests include the political economy of higher education, state fiscal policy, environmental policy, and political and civic organizations. His email address is robert.lonow@utdallas.edu.

Formal governance structures in higher education have been evolving for decades. How much change can be accomplished without enacting a political mountain by trying to steer boards is an important question going forward. Among the opportunities identified in a report on the role of governing boards, an important aspect that is particularly relevant is the opportunity to increase the role of the university’s contribution to economic and additional cost categories. Another possibility would be to include retention and graduation rates. The university’s contribution to economic operation is a lesser consideration. A regression model of administrative costs for a single year in chapter 4 could be expanded to multiple years to better reflect the role of government structure and mode of operation.

Finally, what other measures of university behavior and performance might be used to assess the effects of government structure and mode of operation from engaging in arms race.

Statewide coordinating boards can track spending and use the information to discourage individual governing boards in the same way. A strategic coordinating board can track spending and use the information to discourage individual governing boards in the same way. A strategic coordinating board can track spending and use the information to discourage individual governing boards in the same way.

Interest implies a lack of cooperation—suggests that such cost constraints may be unlikely to happen very often. How will the state, therefore, govern and improve the same? To further the state’s dilemma—which describes situations where short-run self-interest conflicts with long-run goals—residence halls, Koch and Grolla recognize that institutions that do so may risk losing students to competitors, but their advice ultimately boils down to “just say no” to playing real-competitive game. The logic of the prisoner’s dilemma—